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International Adjudication presents abundant material, particularly concerning the practice of
early mixed claims commissions and tribunals. For that, it is commendable. It may prove signif-
icantly helpful for the developing practice of adjudication of claims between states and nationals
of other states.
BOOK REVIEW
INTERNATIONAL ADJUDICATION: PROCEDURAL ASPECTS. By V.S. Mani.
The Hague, Boston, London: Martinus Nijhoff, 1980. Pp. xx,
456. $68.50.
V.S. Mani's International Adjudication: Procedural Aspects is
the first book in English on international procedure' since Ro-
senne's two volume The Law and Practice of the International
Court.2 Mani may be known to international lawyers as the author
of a series of articles on procedural questions 3 published in the late
1960's and the early 1970's. His book will be very useful to those
interested in international procedure; it is commendable but with
certain reservations.
I.
Mani's work is a thorough and painstakingly researched work
of legal scholarship, especially in its treatment of international
claims commissions and tribunals. It is not, however, a comprehen-
sive presentation of procedure before all international tribunals.
1. Mani defines international procedure as "the actual procedure before an interna-
tional tribunal commencing from initiation of proceedings, through presentation of plead-
ings, oral proceedings, evidence, incidental proceedings, and post-decisional proceedings."
V.S. MANI, INTERNATIONAL ADJUDICATION: PROCEDURAL ASPECTS 10 (1980).
2. S. ROSENNE, THE LAW AND PRACTICE OF THE INTERNATIONAL COURT (1965). Rosenne's
PROCEDURE IN THE INTERNATIONAL COURT: A COMMENTARY ON THE 1978 RULES OF THE
INTERNATIONAL COURT OF JUSTICE has not yet been published. For other important works on
international procedure, see C.M. BISHOP, INTERNATIONAL ARBITRAL PROCEDURE (1930); K.S.
CARLSTON, THE PROCESS OF INTERNATIONAL ARBITRATION (1946); A.H. FELLER, THE MEXICAN
CLAIMS COMMISSIONS 1923-34: A STUDY IN THE LAW AND PROCEDURE OF INTERNATIONAL
TRIBUNALS (1935); M.O. HUDSON, THE PERMANENT COURT OF INTERNATIONAL JUSTICE 1920-
1942 (1943); R.C. MORIS, INTERNATIONAl ARBITRATION AND PROCEDURE (1911); J.H. RAL-
STON, THE LAW AND PROCEDURE OF INTERNATIONAL TRIBUNALS (1926); 8 J. VERZIJL, INTERNA-
TIONAL LAW IN HISTORICAL PERSPECTIVE: INTER-STATE DISPUTES AND THEIR SETTLEMENT
(1976).
3. Mani, A Review of the Functioning of the International Court of Justice, 11 INDIAN J.
INT'L L. 27 (1971); Mani, Audi Alteram Partem: Journey of a Principle from the Realms of
Private Procedural Law to the Realms of International Procedural Law, 9 INDIAN J. INT'L L.
381 (1969); Mani, Interim Measures of Protection: Article 41 of the ICJ Statute and Article 94
of the UN Charter, 10 INDIAN J. INT'L L. 359 (1970); Mani, On Interim Measures of
Protection: ICJ Practice, 13 INDIAN J. INT'L L. 262 (1973); Mani, The Advisory Opinion in
Namibia Case: A Critique, 11 INDIAN J. INT'L L. 467 (1971); Mani, The Barcelona Traction
Case (Second Phase) 1970 through the International Court: A Case Comment, 11 INDIAN J.
INT'L L. 112 (1971).
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The author hardly mentions the Court of Justice of the European
Communities and his description of the 1978 Rules of the Interna-
tional Court of Justice 4 never reaches the level of critical commen-
tary. His presentation of materials through the early 1970's is com-
plete, but later developments, such as the oil concession
arbitrations 5 and the decisions of the International Court of Justice
after 1974, are omitted. Finally, Mani ignores several significant
French and Italian scholarly works on the subject.6
An outstanding feature of Mani's study is its presentation of
arbitration practice, emphasizing proceedings before mixed claims
commissions and tribunals. The author's historical discussion brings
early arbitration practice to the modern lawyer's attention. Most of
those cases arose in Anglo-American settings and involved claims of
individuals against foreign states. Mani's treatment of this area is
especially valuable in view of the developing arbitration practice
between states and foreign nationals, as in the oil concession arbi-
trations.7
Unfortunately, Mani does not follow his excellent treatment of
early arbitrations with an adequate consideration of recent devel-
opments. His analysis of the 1958 Model Rules on Arbitral Proce-
dure 8 is insufficient. He does not address in detail the World Bank
Convention,9 its International Center for the Settlement of Invest-
ment Disputes (ICSID) or the arbitration rules it promulgated. 0
4. 4 I.C.J. Acts & Docs. 92 (1978).
5. Libyan Am. Oil Co. (LIAMCO) v. Government of the Libyan Arab Republic, 62
I.L.R. 141 (1977); Texaco Overseas Petroleum Co. v. Government of the Libyan Arab
Republic, 53 I.L.R. 389 (1975) (preliminary award), merits decided, 53 I.L.R. 422 (1977);
BP Exploration Co. (Libya) v. Government of the Libyan Arab Republic, 53 I.L.R. 297
(1973), re-opening denied, 53 I.L.R. 375 (1974).
6. See, e.g., M. Bos, LES CONDITIONS DU PROCES EN DROIT INTERNATIONAL PUBLIC (1957);
A. DEL VECCHIO, LE PARTI NEL PROCESSO INTERNAZIONALE (1975); G. GUYOMAR, COMMENTAIRE
DU REGLEMENT DE LA COUR INTERNATIONALE DE JUSTICE. INTERPRETATION ET PRATIQUE (1973);
B. SCHENK GRAF VON STAUFFENBERG, STATUT Er REGLEMENT DE LA COUR PERMANENTE DE
JUSTICE INTERNATIONALE. ELEMENTS D'INTERPRErATION (1934).
7. See supra note 5.
8. 13 U.N. CAOR Supp. (No. 9) at 5, U.N. Doc. A/3859 (1958), reprinted in 53 AM. J.
INT'L L. 239 (1959).
9. Convention on the Settlement of Investment Disputes Between States and Nationals
of Other States, opened or signature Mar. 18, 1965, 17 U.S.T. 1270, T.I.A.S. No. 6090, 575
U.N.T.S. 159.
10. ICSID Doc. No. 4, pt. D (1967), reprinted in 7 I.L.M. 351, 376 (1968). For a
discussion of the first arbitration utilizing the ICSID facilities, see Lalive, The First "World
Bank" Arbitration (Holiday Inns v. Morocco)-Some Legal Problems, 51 BRIT. Y.B. INT'L L.
123 (1980).
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The UNCITRAL Arbitration Rules of 197611 are not even men-
tioned. The author thus missed an opportunity to blend or "cross-
fertilize," to use J.G. Wetter's expression,12 historical arbitration
practice with the most recent developments. One can only hope
that he will pursue that worthy goal in the future.
The introduction clearly indicates that the author's intent was
to treat only selected aspects of international procedure which are
relevant to the communicative process. Mani views the communi-
cative process as the main function of international adjudication.
He explicitly excludes such topics as default, special chambers,
settlement/discontinuance, the post-judgment issues, and the inter-
nal practices of the courts. Hence, some of the most urgent prob-
lems of international procedure are not discussed.
The most serious flaw in the communicative process of current
international adjudication is default. Default occurs when one of
the parties refuses to participate in the communicative process, as it
has been traditionally understood, by declining to appear before
the appropriate tribunal. Since 1972, all seven proceedings insti-
tuted in the International Court of Justice by unilateral application
have been default cases.' 3 In a default situation, the principle of
audiatur et altera pars 14 is of overwhelming importance. The exclu-
sion of default from International Adjudication is therefore inexpli-
cable, particularly in light of Mani's emphasis on the audiatur
principle.
The author discusses both arbitral and judicial procedure. He
recognizes that differences exist between the rules of procedure for
ad hoe tribunals and for preconstituted tribunals. Mani rightly
advocates a "contextual approach to procedure" ' and speaks out
for flexible rules that "must be compatible-with the type of tribunal
before which they are sought to operate and the nature of the
11. 31 U.N. GAOR Supp. (No. 17) at 34, U.N. Doc. A/31/17 (1976), reprinted in 15
I.L.M. 701 (1976).
12. 1 J.G. WErrER, THE INTERNATIONAL ARBITRAL PROCESS. PUBLIC AND PRIVATE 3
(1979).
13. See 1979-80 I.C.J.Y.B. 114 n.2 (1980).
14. The term is synonymous with the right to be heard or due process. See BIN CHENG,
GENERAL PRINCIPLES OF LAW AS APPLIED BY THE INTERNATIONAL COURTS AND TRIBUNALS 291
(1953).
15. V.S. MANI, supra note 1, at 5.
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controverted claims awaiting solution."'" He consistently separates
the procedural rules for different types of tribunals. Unfortunately,
he does not clearly indicate those features of the communicative
phase which distinguish tribunals for the resolution of interstate
disputes from tribunals for the resolution of claims by individuals
against a foreign state. Those differences may lead to widely diver-
gent rules of procedure.
Mani thus portrays "the state of [the] law on the basis of
empirical evidence" ' 7 by presenting only selected aspects of interna-
tional procedure which relate to the technical side of the communi-
cative process. For the material it presents, his study is commend-
able. Unfortunately, it ignores the real defects in international
procedure, their origins, and possible remedies.
II.
In chapter II, Mani develops a definition of fundamental pro-
cedural rights. His formulation encompasses" 'certain fundamental
rules of procedure' . . . which are 'inherent in the judicial process'
... and . . . 'generally recognized in all [municipal] procedures.' "I,
According to Mani, such principles include audiatur et altera
pars, also known as audi alteram partem, or the right to be heard
and the principle of equality of the parties. The audiatur and
equality principles are complementary and inseparable from the
principle of impartiality. Yet, the first two have different origins.
The equality principle is based on the structure of international
law; it emanates from the consent basis of international arbitration
and adjudication between states and from the sovereign equality of
states. The audiatur principle, in contrast, has made the "journey
of a principle from the realms of private procedural law to the
realms of international procedural law." '9
Problems arise in applying fundamental procedural rights to
actual cases, not in reaching a consensus about their validity. 20 The
16. Id.
17. Id. at 6.
18. Id. at 12 (quoting K.S. CARLSTON, THE PROCESS OF INTERNATIONAL ARBITRATION 38
(1946)).
19. This is the title of one of Mani's articles concerning the audi alteram partem
principle, supra note 3.
20. Mani argues that the audiatur principle is a general principle of law recognized by
most legal systems, but notes that transposition of this municipal principle onto the body of
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audiatur principle discussed by Mani is, in the opinion of this
reviewer, so vaguely formulated that almost everyone would agree
with it, and it probably exists in most municipal legal orders.
The first step in the application of basic principles is defining
their place among other tools of decision. A preconstituted tribunal
should resort to general principles only after having considered its
constitutional instrument and rules. An ad hoc tribunal should
examine general principles only after having considered its jurisdic-
tional instrument/compromis and possibly its promulgated rules.
Once the tribunal has concluded that it must invoke basic principles
of procedure, it must decide which specific rights flow from those
principles. Mani lists six specific rights that flow, in his view, from
the audiatur and equality principles: the right to composition of the
tribunal, the right to be heard, the right to due deliberation by a
duly constituted tribunal, the right to a reasoned judgment, the
right to a tribunal free from corruption and the right to proceedings
free from fraud.2 1
Mani concisely presents the practice of international courts
and tribunals with regard to those six rights. The discussion reveals
that many of the limitations on those rights are highly technical. At
the same time, he emphasizes that flexibility and the absence of
technicalities are the essence of international procedure. The author
concludes that failure to observe these fundamental rights results in
a denial of justice. He does not, however, analyze the consequences
of such denial, which might include nullity and the revision of
decisions.
In chapter III, Mani examines the legal formalities required to
initiate international proceedings. This reviewer disagrees with
Mani's characterization of the application/compromis as l'acte in-
troductif. 22 That document is not of a mere "informal" character.
23
It is the very point of departure for the facts to be considered, the
law to be applied, the determination of the subject matter of the
international law may not necessarily be successful. V.S. MANI, supra note 1, at 20. For a
prominent example of a mere transposition onto the international level, see BIN CHENG, supra
note 14, at 290-98. For a critical approach, see von Mangoldt, La comparaison des systemes
de droit comme moyen d'elaboration de la procedure des tribunaux internationaux, 40
ZEITSCHIFr FUR AUSLANDISCHES OFFENTLICHES RECHT UND VOLKERRECHT 554 (1980).
21. V.S. MANI, supra note 1, at 25-36.
22. Id. at 78.
23. Id.
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dispute and is the "critical date" for amendments of pleadings and
submissions. 24 Similarly, Mani's treatment of the concept of seisin
does not reveal its critical importance. 25
Mani examines written proceedings at length in the fourth
chapter. He focuses on the problems of simultaneous, as opposed to
successive, presentation of "pleadings." He does not elaborate the
problems involved in default proceedings nor discuss the practice of
the International Court of Justice regarding the institution of a
quasi-preliminary objections phase without formal objections. 26
The treatment of dilatory pleas (preliminary objections) is descrip-
tive rather than problem-oriented. Without supporting argument,
Mani asserts that international courts have the inherent power to
entertain and to raise preliminary objections suo motu (proprio
motu). That proposition is disputable and needs to be supported.
The discussion of ancillary claims reveals that different types
of international tribunals may not be treated in the same way.
Mani asserts that counterclaims and set-offs do not arise " 'and in
the nature of things cannot', arise before an international tribu-
nal."' 27 Such a statement is too sweeping.
The critical problems surrounding submissions and their inter-
pretation are developed inadequately. Mani had no lack of sources
from which to draw material. The Nuclear Test Cases of 1973-7428
provide sharply divided concurring and dissenting views 29 in addi-
24. See M. Bos, supra note 6, at 41; 2 S. ROSENNE, THE LAW AND PRACTICE OF THE
INTERNATIONAL COURT 509-25 (1965). That point has been criticized elsewhere. See Book
Review, 76 AM. J. INT'L L. 660-61 (1982).
25. Cf. I. SHIHATA, THE PoWER OF THE INTERNATIONAL COURT TO DETERMINE ITS OWN
JURISDICTION: COMPETENCE DE LA COMPETENCE 84-89 (1965).
26. The difficult and controversial question is whether the International Court of
Justice may on its own motion initiate a preliminary phase examining its jurisdiction and the
admissibility of the application. See, e.g., Fisheries Jurisdiction (W. Ger. v. Ice.), 1973 I.C.J.
12 (Judgment of Feb. 2); Fisheries Jurisdiction (U.K. v. Ice.), 1972 I.C.J. 12 (Interim
Protection Order of Aug. 17).
27. V.S. MANI, supra note 1, at 134 (quoting J.H. RALSTON, supra note 2, at 211).
28. Nuclear Tests (N.Z. v. Fr.), 1974 I.C.J. 457 (Judgment of Dec. 20); Nuclear Tests
(Austl. v. Fr.), 1974 I.C.J. 253 (Judgment of Dec. 20).
29. See Nuclear Tests (N.Z. v. Fr.), 1974 I.C.J. at 479 (Forster, J., concurring), 480
(Gros, J., concurring), 483 (Ignacio-Pinto, J., concurring), 494 (Onyeama, J., Dillard, J.,
Jimenez de Arechaga, J., Waldock, J., dissenting), 524 (de Castro, J., dissenting), 525
(Barwick, J., dissenting); Nuclear Tests (Austl. v. Fr.), 1974 I.C.J. at 275 (Forster, J.,
concurring), 276 (Gros, J., concurring), 298 (Petren, J., concurring), 308 (Ignacio-Pinto, J.,
concurring), 312 (Onyeama J., Dillard, J., Jimenez de Arechaga, J., Waldock, J., dissent-
ing), 372 (de Castro, J., dissenting), 391 (Barwick, J., dissenting).
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tion to the opinions of the Court. Furthermore, those opinions have
inspired heated debate among legal scholars and practicing law-
yers.3 0 The fourth chapter concludes with very enlightening com-
ments on publicity and language problems in international pro-
ceedings. The fifth chapter aptly summarizes the technicalities and
problems of oral argument.
The author considers the production of evidence in detail. Yet,
astonishingly, he does not take note of a fully revised 1975 edition of
Durward Sandifer's Evidence Before International Tribunals.31
Furthermore, Mani does not emphasize sufficiently the problems of
judicial notice, which have recently led to heated controversies
before the International Court of Justice 32 and even before arbitral
tribunals.3 3 Mani inadequately examines the power of tribunals to
procure evidence and the 1978 Rules of Court of the International
Court of Justice, 34 which enlarge the powers of the Court consider-
ably, but questionably. Article 62 empowers the Court to call upon
a party at any time to produce evidence or to furnish explanations
or "to itself seek other information for this purpose." 35 Article 72
provides parties the opportunity to comment only upon evidence or
explanations supplied by another party.3 6 If the Court, however,
acquires information from a source independent of the parties, it
need not grant the parties an opportunity to be heard on that
information. In this reviewer's opinion, the audiatur altera pars
principle should apply to that situation as well.3 7 Recent practice
before the International Court of Justice and scholarly writing
reveal that the procedure of the Court suffers from an underdevel-
oped audiatur principle. The International Court of Justice thus
30. See, e.g., H. FALSAFI, L'AFFAIRE DES ESSAIS NUCLEAIRES DEVANT LA COUR INTERNATION-
ALE DE JUSTICE (1978); MACDONALD & HOuCH, The Nuclear Tests Case Revisited, 20 GER.
Y.B. INT'L L. 337 (1977).
31. D. SANDIFER, EVIDENCE BEFORE INTERNATIONAL TRIBUNALS (2d ed. 1975).
32. See supra notes 28-29.
33. See Bowett, The Arbitration Between the United Kingdom and France Concerning
the Continental Shelf Boundary in the English Channel and South-Western Approaches, 49
BAIT. Y.B. INT'L L. 1 (1978); Sinclair, Some Procedural Aspects of Recent International
Litigation, 30 INT'L CoMP. L.Q. 338 (1981).
34. See supra note 4.
35. Id. art. 62.
36. Id. art. 72.
37. See G. Wegen, Mootness in the Contentious Jurisdiction of the International Court
(May 26, 1981) (LL.M. thesis, Harvard University School of Law). See also supra note 33.
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seems to be emerging as a partner of the courts of continental
Europe, whose methods are rather inquisitorial. 38
The chapter on intervention summarizes its history and prac-
tice. Mani's observations and conclusions have recently been partly
affirmed and partly rendered obsolete by the International Court of
Justice's judgment concerning Malta's application to intervene in
the Tunisian-Libyan dispute over their boundary on the continental
shelf .3  The chapter on interim measures of protection is based
mainly on two earlier publications by Mani. 40 Most of the issues
that were formerly in dispute have been resolved to some degree by
the seven cases involving the "injunctions" that have been before
the International Court of Justice in the last ten years. 4'
III.
International Adjudication presents abundant material, par-
ticularly concerning the practice of early mixed claims commissions
and tribunals. For that, it is commendable. It may prove signifi-
cantly helpful for the developing practice of adjudication of claims
between states and nationals of other states.
Gerhard Wegen*
38. Advocating a decidedly stronger, more inquisitorial International Court is its former
President. See Lachs, The Revised Procedure of the International Court of Justice, in ESSAYS
ON THE DEVELOPMENT OF THE INTERNATIONAL LEGAL ORDER 21 (1980). It may be noted that,
in a different context, Soviet Judge Morozov invoked a "sovereign right" of the Court in
procedural matters. Delimitation of the Maritime Boundary in the Gulf of Maine Area (Can.
v. U.S.), 1982 I.C.J. 6, 11 (1982) (Order of Jan. 20) (Morozov, J., dissenting).
39. Continental Shelf (Tunisia v. Libyan Arab Jamahirya), 1981 I.C.J. 2 (Judgment of
Apr. 14).
40. See supra note 3.
41. See supra note 13.
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